Richard and Nancy Madsen v. Washington Mutual Bank : Reply Brief by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2006
Richard and Nancy Madsen v. Washington Mutual
Bank : Reply Brief
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Joseph Palmer; Moyle & Draper; Stephen Tingey & Elaina M. Maragakis; Ray, Quinney & Nebeker;
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee.
Robert J. Debry; Lynn P. Heward; Attorneys for Plaintiffs and Appellants.
This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Madsen v. Washington Mutual Bank, No. 20060597 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2006).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/6652
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
RICHARD MADSEN and 
NANCY MADSEN, his wife, for 
themselves and all others 
similarly situated, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
vs. 
WASHINGTON MUTUAL BANK fsb, 
(successor to PRUDENTIAL FEDERAL 
SAVINGS and LOAN ASSOCIATION), 
Defendant and Appellee. 
5c 
Case No. 20060597-^ . 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS AND BRIEF OF CROSS-APPELLEES 
APPEAL 
FROM THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
HONORABLE LEON A. DEVER, JUDGE 
feqph Palmer 
fcLE & DRAPER 
^EastFourth South #900 
*LakeCity,UT84111 
| | t ien Tingey & Elaina M. Maragakis 
^ *, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
§Sbuth State Street, Suite 1400 
|Uke City, UT 84145-0385 
l&rneysfor Defendant and Appellee 
ROBERT J. DEBRY - A0849 
LYNN P. HEWARD - A1479 
ROBERT J. DeBRY & ASSOCIATES 
4252 South 700 East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84107 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs and Appellants 
LIST OF PARTIES 
The above caption of this case contains the names of all parties to the proceeding 
in the court whose judgment is sought to be reviewed. However, Nancy Madsen is the 
only surviving named representative plaintiff, and Washington Mutual Bank is the only 
surviving defendant, being the successor in interest to Prudential. 
Throughout this brief, plaintiffs and appellants will be referred to as "Madsen," 
and defendant and appellee will be referred to as "Prudential." 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
PRIJDENTIAL^S ARGUMENTS ON FEDERAL REGULATIONS MUST FAIL 
Prudential argues that Madsen has no claim because feudal regu.aih ;, ;M \ iu,.: 
a l l l L l l l l l ' i l o i 11)11 M ' S l " P l l l l l l l l l l i l l , S i l l "' • >' ! • : * : > * 
field." (Brief of Appellee and Cross-Appellant a lp . >+ *s.j However, .Prudential^ 
argument on federal regulations must fail. 
A. Utah Supreme Court 
V\ hen this c ase • * as before the I Jtah Si lpreme C()i ir (:.,  I h i i (iei i t iaFs a ppella te bi ief 
argued: 
A n e w regulat ion was promulgated by the Federal H o m e Loan 
Bank Board on June 16, 1975 to prescr ibe the c i rcumstances under 
which federal savings and loan associat ions, such as defendant , m a y 
pay interest on escrows. It provides (12 C F.R ., §545.6-11 (c)): 
Except as provided by contract, a Federal associa te n 
shall have no obligation to pay interest on escrow 
accounts apart from the dut ies imposed by this 
paragraph, (Emphasis from Prudential appellate brief.) 
One of the main purposes of federal regulation of federal savings and 
loan associations is to protect the federal agency in its acquisition of 
mortgages and related notes from the federal savings and loan 
associations. Thus, great deference should be given to the federal 
regulations and the cases which interpret them in determining 
whether plaintiffs have a claim against defendant. Udall v. Tallman, 
380 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1965). Those regulations all imply that plaintiffs' 
claim is unfounded. Brief of Respondent, Utah Supreme Court, 
Sept. 2, 1976, at 4, 5 and I ? -} ; ~ ^ n" ni. 
1 
In suiTinlaiy, Prudential's federal theory has already been presented to the Utah 
Supreme Court It is not necessary that federal questions to be decided by a federal court. 
Federal questions can just as well be decided by a state court: "It must be remembered that 
when ii'iliMiil ifiii1 Jinn , .mi iM1 in i iiuscs pending in -link* t nulls IIIUM1 i nutls ni» (R'tftrfly 
competent to decide them, and it is their duty to do so. Chandler v. O 'Bryan, 445 F.2d 
1045, 1057-8 (10th Cii 1971) If 12 C.F.R. § 545.6-• •.' ^ destroyed Madsen's cause of 
action, the Utah Supreme Court would ii,.vc been \o\\ ^ -> alhrm the ti ial court's 
disi nissal o" ei 1:1 rii t) ;; 'eai s ago.1 
B. I 'he I ei ith Circuit Court of Appeals 
After Prudential lost in state court {% A above), Prudential filed a separate action 
for declaratory relief in federal court i u Rderal trial i^ -urt ruk\ i. \,t ^- o Prudential 
and Madsen appealed I hi is, • • * \ . ; : ' h 
Pnidenl • " s federal defenses. See Madsen v. Prudential Federal Savings and Loan 
Ass% (or Madsen II) 635 F.2d 797 (10th Cir. 1980). "\\\ spouse to these federal 
defenses, the Tenth Circuit held in this very case that: 
i iere, n . - .:;WU»U.M\ argued that application of state law Wwu-., 
create a significant conflict because federal policy requires unilorm 
nationwide standards for the handling of escrow accounts by federal 
savings and loan associations. This argument founders on 'he very 
language of the regulation cited to support it. Section 545.6-1 \ u) 
it makes no difference that the opinion of the Utah Supreme Court in Madsen v. 
Prudential Federal Savings and Loan Ass''n, (or Madsen I) 558 P.2d 1337 (Utah 1977) 
does not specifically discuss federal questions. See Grubb v. Public Utilities Commission 
of Ohio, 281 U.S. 470, 50 S.Ct. 374, 74 L.Ed. 972 (1930). 
2 
provides that a federal savings and loan association shall pay interest 
on escrow accounts if a state statute requires such payments to be 
made by state-chartered institutions, or if payments are required by 
contract, rh regulation expressly anticipates that the obligation of a 
federal institution to pay interest on escrow accounts not only will 
vary from state to state, but from contract to contract. . . . Any 
argument that federal policy requires nationwide uniformity with 
regard to this issue is untenable. 
Given the absence of a significant conflict between the federal polic) 
expressed in section 545.6-11 (c) and the use of state law, we hold 
that state law is applicable in determining whethei Prudential 
contracted to pay interest on the Madsens' escrow account. 
(Emphasis added.) Mads en 11, 635 F,2d at 802 and 803. 
In . . ii \ 11 it Tcnlli ( 'in in! t "iiiiirl ol Appeals lias squan/lv ruled ;uMins1 
Pri identia 1's ffeclc • 1 offenses. 
POINT II 
PRUDENTIAL HAS NOT PRESERVED THE ISSUE OF THE 
(SO-CALLED) SPECIAL AGREEMENT 
Madsen I slates the following. 
[W Jhen the propei ty piuigud iso:suji,i character as not to be 
lessened by use, the pledgee does not incur liability by using it; but if 
from the use of it profits are derived, pledgee must, in the absence of 
a special agreement, account for them to the pledgor. 
(Emphasis added.) Madsen I, 558 P.2d 1337,, 1340. 
Prudential's Brief argues lh.il llr lii.nl i mill 
. . . improperly excluded the mii-dik WO\ .»f'evidence of a "special 
agreement" between Prudential and Mad^ns. (Lmphasis added.) 
Brief of Appellee and Cross-Appellani at 18. 
3 
However, Prudential did ilot plead any affirmative defense of a "special 
agreement." Furthermore, there is no "offer
 t>f proof Y; 'he record of what the "special 
agreement" inijjjil he 'I In onl\ "oiler oi pro* ; - .. ,ms issue seems to ht !lu lull v .ij;. 
II 11 1'ii In nil H IM Piudi'i itLit' i 
1 n lake the offer of proof because we contend that there are a number 
of additional issues in the case beyond the question of profit. 
I'd be glad to detail those issues. There are at least 24 
of them. 
And in the interest of time I'll spare you ai gumem ,s> u« *\,.u 
contend those additional issues are Trial Trans^-^i ^cv\ T 
at 278-9 (See Ex ^ ) 
The offer of proof quoted above is clearly too vague and ambiguous to preserve anything. 
Prudential also cites an Order dated September 3, 1985 (R. 2029-31) to show that 
the "special contract" issue was properly preserved A. L:» . put tl lat Order was 
never sigutd. (Sec t7x i« i nil IL iniph hi/nrn HHirh, imi mi unsigned \ >rdci m 4HJW that 
ar l l s s u e w a s preserved. 
Finally, a "special agreement" would, by definition, be an "express contract." See? 
Fitzpatrickv. Vermont State Treasurer, I • #•- 4 \\ iM, I < > A.J.d \^ *4, iu< » \ \i>^A): 
Although the term "special agreement" has not been defined, 
the term "special contract" has been defined as one with peculiar 
provisions or stipulations not found in the ordinary contract relating 
to the same subject matter, and which, if omitted, the law will i: lot 
supply. , . A special contract is always an express contract, that 
is, one whose provisions are expressed and not dependent on 
:icatinr A, special agreement, as contemplated in 3 V ,S.A. 
§ 455(a)(9), may therefore be defined as one containing express 
provisions not foiiir4 :" *H ordinary agreement relating to the 
4 
employment of state employees, which provisions, if omitted, the law 
will not supply. (Emphasis added.) 
In summary; Prudential 's "special agreement" argument must fail because 
Prudential has failed t o o I k i eudc iuv »>l »in\ Vxpiri'M pio\ ismns" j>ivim» Pnulnitial 
• ' •• ;-•* Hedged funds. 
POINT III 
CLASS CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO RULE 23 flb)(l)(A) WAS PROPER 
Prudential argues that the class was improperU . e; i:: ie . ; . 
response tc lli.il jrgumeiil is lli.il llu 1 "l.tli Siipin ' " • • A~\ jase that: 
Notwithstanding Prudentiars assertions, this case has a 
precisely defined plaintiff class, consisting of Prudential borrowers 
whose trust deeds contain language identical to the Madsen trust 
deed. The class was certified by Judge Croft in 1977. Madsen i\ 
Prudential Federal Savings & Loan Ass% (or Madsen III) 767 P 2d 
538, 547 (Utah 1988). . 
Ii lion OIIJ Supreme Tom i ilnl mil ii i .UP, piohlniis tulh elass certification when that 
issue was reviewed in 1988. 
Prudential cites several older cases to argue that certification under Rule 
' * • • . .v-v.-t 11 nvever, the scope of Rule 23(b)(1)(A) is best described by 
the recent case oi An, /;. '/ uith As Im 1/ indsoi . " I I l ,' ,„ v i l u I i I ! "' S ( I ) " '> I 
138 L.Ed.2d 689 (1997), which states in part: 
Rule 23(b)(1)(A) "takes in cases where the party is obligated by law 
to treat the members of the class alike (a utility acting towards 
customers; a government imposing a tax), or where the party must 
treat all alike as a matter of practical necessity (a riparian owner 
using water as against downriver owners)," (Citations omitted ) 
5 
:
 • -. v t« l i e i m h e ^ of the class al ike" 
because all class members signed an identical contract See Madsen I. 
Indeed, Prudential has a legal duty to treat all class member s alike because 
Sre Wrshrn Struritirs Co v Sihrr King Consol Miwrig Co., S7 I Huh KK,I( 192 P. 664, 
674(1920): 
Under the law, therefore, appellant was entitled to the dividends that 
were declared on the stock during the time it remained in pledge, and 
it necessarily follows that it received such dividends as a trustee for 
the benefit of the pledgor of the stock, and was bound to account for 
them, and to credit the amount of the dividends upon the debt to 
secure which the stock was pledged. (Emphasis added 
The instant case is similar to the case of Cass Clay, Inc. v. Northwestern Public 
Service Co., 63 F.R.D. 34 (D.S.D. 1974). In that case, the class action was brought on 
behalf c If agi oup oi i c •  :)IIII:ISI it ne i s \ \ ho v\ -ei e all o ei cl mi ge d I:)) 
c .oi n 11 le Id tha t the resoh ition of the dispute "v\ "oi ild reqi lire some kind of distribution plan, 
and that a number of adjudications would present the risk of a number of different 
distribution plans. Thus , the court held that the class would b e maintainable under 
:F R 1) 356 (IS 1 D Ga 1985) 
As the Supreme Court of California has stated: 
:i
 "When either subsection (b)(l 
(b)(3) should not be used, so as to avoid unnecessary inconsistencies and compromises in 
future li t igation." DeBoer v. Mellon Mortgage Co., 64 F.3d 1171 , 1175 (8th Cir. 1995). 
6 
[Controversies involving widely used contracts of adhesion present 
ideal cases for class adjudication; the contracts aire uniform, the same 
principles of interpretation apply to each contract, and all members of 
the class will share a common interest in the interpretation of an 
agreement to which each is a party. Discover Bank v. Superior 
. Court, 36 Cal. 4th 148, **<> r •' P i ^ ^ ^ i n P M i loo \ 106 
(2005), 
In "short, many state and federal cases, with similar fact patterns have been certified 
under Rule 23(b)(1)(A). 
1 .nailv. ri uu.-.i^a: has argued mat L.. - .. : i i e d 1: } c €i tif) ing this • :ase as a 
it" 'I huik/nlul is «ontr| ..* J -\c ligation. Rather, the contrary 
: Lf Prudential is correct, those who were former class members have the right to 
start all over again. See American Tierra Corp. v. City of West Jordan, 840 P.2d 1,:» 7, *u2 
(Utah 1992). 
We agree Wim mc; icdeuu interpretations and conclude as a matter of 
Utah law that when a proper appeal of a class certification decision is 
taken, the tolling benefit continues on behalf of all members of the 
class until the class issue is finally determined by the decision on 
appeal. 
In summary, if this Court conclude* ihui. class cluneal.on was inp^y. . 
simply opens itim, floodgates li>r some 10 000 1 Hah f;miilirs In Mr brand new individual 
- • r ' Hah . ^jris. 
P'uduniiai argues nun, ouici I^ILSS member m puium *• class Midline]-; au not 
interested in this lawsuit because no one else has filed a similar or companion lawsuits, 
But, perhaps, other class members have not filed companion lawsuits simply because they 
have seen the many newspaper articles about the instant {Madsen) case; and they believe 
that they just need to wait for this lawsuit to end and, as members of the certified class, 
they will automatically collect. Also, class member were falsely told that their pledged 
7 
Generally, a trial court order granting class certification is reviewed "under an abuse 
of discretion standard. See, e.g., Smilow v. Southwestern Bell Mobile Systems, Inc., 323 
F.3d 32, * >(• i . w\ , ,, t'usL csj w/i1/,,,-. <\.,i. nor/^...^; ttzrr, •. • 
I ill lil "i i '(Mill , II M I -M. .,,,r /', , ',,, < //iiv,,,-, ^' 1 \\ \ , V> ^KS 
SJE.2d52, M (2003). 
POINT IV 
T H E SIX YEAR STATUTE O F L I M I T A T I O N S 
IVfadsen has argued tl lat tl lei e is no statute of lin litations foi tl lis ca se (See I >oint V 
bel :) * ) 1 lo < a e \ ru. If a i 13 stati ite • : f ITII: it lita tions applies, it would be the six-year statute. 
(Madsen's opening Brief at Point lil.j The six-year statute of limitations at issue (78-1.2-
23) states: 
An action may bi 'M ught within six yeuis . , upon any conluul, 
obligation, or l iabihh I'onndod lipnn im iiisliiimi'iil in writing , . 
(Emphasis added ) 
Madsen's opening Brief then compared the statute of limitations, as quoted above, 
a ith the mandate of our Supreme Court, in Mads en Iy which states: 
This action is founded on a deed of ti i 1st and was brougl it to 
determine the , . . legal consequences ip : 1 1 .1 sr L .ant to such 
terms (En: lphasis added) Madsen 1 558 P 2 i at 1338. 
-funds were placed in a "1 ion-interest bearing account.5'' (See pp.. 14, 15, below ) Class 
members would have little or no reason to file individual lawsuits if their pledged funds 
were truly in a "non-interest bearing" account. 
8 
Thus the argument boils down to this: 
A.. According to the mandate in Mads en /, the Madsen lawsuit is: 
4b
 FOUNDED ON A [WRITTEN] DEED OF TRl-^" 
B. The six-year statute of limitations applies if the lawsu.. -
"FOUNDED ON A N INSTRUMENT IN WRITING 
1 i0 STATU •: - : 1ITATIONS 
Madsen's opening Brief argued that there is no statute of limitations for money 
'deposited'" in a bank. Madsen' s opening BIN (Turfhei aigiius Dial he iiiaiuLtk <»( llm 
Si ip] < :;n i€ Cc in n I ir "'I it idsi rn It established 1 he facttha tMa dsen's pledge was a type of 
"deposit," and, therefore, no statute of limitations would apply,4 Specifically, Madsen's 
brief relied upon the following language from Madsen I: 
A deposit of money as security jui ihc \K::> *i..:a\.^z oi u . - m u ^ ^ 
been recognized as a vn'id plcdiv. =Fm: --JSI-- added.> h./f::dsi",n 
A gain, Prudential attempts to sidestep the issue. Prudential argues that: 
The passage cited by Madsen merely states that money can be 
pledged as a security. Brief of Appellee and Cross-Appellant at pp. 
25-26. 
40n pages 10 11 of its opening brief. Prudential quotes the case summary 
published at the beginning of Madsen /, asserting that this case summary was actually 
prepared by the Utah Supreme Court. However, see West Publishing Co, v. Mead Data 
Central Inc., 799 R2d 1219, 1221-22 (8th Cir. 1986), which states that it is the West 
Company (not the court) that adds headnotes and a "synopsis" to each opinion in its 
reporter system. Furthermore, the Supreme Court of Mississippi did not rely on the case 
summary when it recognized that Madsen /held that a pledgee must account to the 
pledgor for profits accruing from the pledge. Murray < Payne, 437 So.2d 47, 54 (Miss. 
1983). 
9 
However, Prudential's interpretation is totally frivolous. If our Supreme Court had 
wanted to say; "money can be pledged as a security/' our Supreme Court would have 
simply written ''money can be pledged as a seci nt it) ." 
P a tl ici , tl ie issi ic in h fat is en I was whether Madsen's nioi ithly payment to the bank 
should be defined as a pledge. Our Supreme Court held inter alia that: 
A deposit of money [such as Madsen's monthly payment] for the 
performance of a contract [such as the Trust Deed] has been 
recognized as a \-M\A pledge. (Emphasis added.) •'•/.'*• " ' • x '1 
at 1339 
The case of Larsen v. Utah Loan and Trust Co., 23 Utah 449, 65 P. 208 (1901) is 
in accord: 
While the fund was deposited in the bank for a special purposes, it 
was still a deposit within the meaning of section 3154 [predecessor 
to § 78-12-34]. . . and there was no limitation of time in which an 
action to recover it should be commenced 65 P. at 211. 
See also Ellis v. Roberts, 98 Pa. Super. 49, 57 (1929) (A deposit is "[a]nything given as a 
pledge"); Lawrence v I K Parlier Estate Co„y 92 P.2d 917, 920 (Cal. A pp "QQQ) ("A 
pledge is a depos.. . ^wrter Oxford English Dictionary (Fiftl i. Ed 2002) (<: 'deposit: : V 
contract"). 
Indeed, the trial court has already reached the following Finding of Fact: 
I Jpon receiving each monthly payment, Prudential irnmeu-au;/ 
deposited the entire check into its general operating account, 
(Emphasis added.) (Findings of Fact, and Conclusions of Law , 
Finding No 5 R 2998.) 
• 
Finally, Madsen's opening Brief also relied upon the case of Conner v. Smith, 51 
ah 129, 160 V 1 ^ 160 (1917) which states: 
yyrj^ eT1 propcjiy is nciu . ;u a* .^tui n \. m ^auiwA desert 
that he holds it a/K !>^" ' -l"or <md then4w arnnire a ri^ht 
to it under th? r 
Prudential argues that the language in Conner, above,, is only dicia, which >houuj 
be ignored by this Court. However, the case of State v. Menzies, 889 r.-ld ^y ^ J < w :.an 
v criicai stare decisis, L;IC I'HM O; ihese two facets, compels a C^L*I : 
follow strictly the decisions rendered, by a higher court.. • i. _ 
this mandate, lower courts are obliged to follow the holding of a 
higher court, as well as any "judicial dicta" that may be announced. 
by the higher court, [citations omitted,.] 
Tn summary, this con,, . . M U R I ; . former v ., :..*.. . A A A-.^ .JIU:L*:.-.' 
POINT VI 
DAMAGE CLAIMS AFTER 1979 
,-l. \v i / - 4 U . t . A , (Miiy dpiMiC-h u> Lt^liOHb liiCu a l l ^ l J a n u a r y i . t -; •  .-
As described in Madsen's opening Brief, Madsen took out a home loan in 1964. 
j)e duration of the loan was 25 years (or until 1989) and,. M'adsen paid pledged, funds for 
each of those 25 years. Therefore, Madsen seeks damages 1oi me pci i* -u
 v ; . — 
Ho\ vever, the ti ial coi n 1: cut off dam. .'• • • • * :H.VII^ .: - *. < ^.JIUUMUII -.M 
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L a w 1i > sLiics. l| him-H't^  ^qniiunr mi IIIIIIIC in, I >7C> h\ reason of Utah Code Ann. § 7-
17.4 " ( \L 3002.) ••' i ;" 4 is included in Exhibit J to Madsen's opening Brief.) 
Madsen claims that § 7-17-4 ca.nnot apply to this case because § ' I ' I' If." 1 nl the 
same Act states; 
1'hr pro* "sions i>l this acl shall apply . , . </"') lo all actions filed after 
Piiiiiuiil 1, P)1^ (Emphasis added.) 
And, of course, the instant action was filed in 19^5, four years before January 1, 1979. 
Prudential's Brief totally fails to address the above argument, v \ , j ' . ; . ». 
response to ah - ...-. U J I M .^  L j;y, exclusive]) \ on l ^'-!r 
"1 "he pi o" ; ' 1 ' -* 1) to ail reserve accounts." 
Of course, i r -^-l 7-10(1; ("shall apply , , _-Jl reserve accounts'" :- inconsistent 
with § 7-17-10(2) ("shall apply . . . to all action filed after January 1, I{) /9) The i.ourt 
must then resort, to Nelson v. ,>^. ,,
 L,„, ; ^ ; , . , . - - * .. * ' 
Clearly the first and last sentences of [the statutes] are patently 
inconsistent This court will not construe a statute in such a way 
as to render certain, \ iable parts meaningless and void. 
* sf: jfc 
1 b choose which statement controls uvci mc WUWK WUUIU an • ^ 
legislation by judicial fiat . . Accordingly, the power to rev - J 
that ipr-iy-ii'V-niK ]*<-.: \ • \,\\- M)e province of our legislature. 
Prudential's Brief was totally silent on the Nelson case, above. 
Since § 7-17-1, et seq., does not apply to actions filed before its enactment the 
following subsections (B-F) referring to 11 I •«ml atute are acadei nic. 
1 o 
B I "he Nixon case docs not apply to this case. 
Prudential's Brief (p > • 0 states that the case of Nixon v American Savings & Loan 
Assn., 635 P.2d24 (Utah . 19K -Mils Huu ihc SLUUIC (v . • - . J A ^ 
case. 
In Nixon, the plaintiffs filed an action after the statute was enacted, and plaintiffs 
sought a statutory remedy. In the instant case. Madsci, inuj a,: action before the statute 
was enacted, seeking a cony - common l.i'i'i reinah hiilhtTiiiore, a •• ••: 
§ 7 1 3 10( 1),, the stati :i te cannot applj I: : this Madsen case. (See subsection A abovc, ,i\ 
short, all of the legal conclusions in Nixon relate to and interpret a statute. All ^f the legal 
claims in the instant case relate to and interpret a contract.. 
C. 9 /-1 -4 et. scq. does not apply to claims mi pmnb 
/ i • . +t i -r^os after 191? oy 
reason «** ; n-i 7-4 u.v^.A. % , i7-4, Utah Code Ann. slates m part: 
(a) The borrower may elect to .maintain a non-interest-bearing 
reserve account to be serviced, by the lender at no charge to 
the borrower; (Emphasis added.) 
• Pi irsuaiit to the foregoing statutes, Pri :i dential sent out a form letter to its 
customers. (R. 3007.) That form letter states in part: 
You may continue your monthly payment as is now provided for in 
your loan documents to be deposited in a non interest bearing reserve 
account. We will continue to provide you the service of paying your 
1.3 
y u i v -a\es and/or insuiancc premiums at not cost as they become 
uut, or, i ['Emphasis addedv I v. J JV ,. 
As noted, above,, the statute and the form letter sent out by Prudential both relate 
exclusive!) ;*. ;;
 t^.v , .owever, tins Lnvsiiil Isis, inn! lining lo d \ illllli ''iinitHiivsl "' 'Rallini 
M»M1M I : inn" loi u|iiiMii(il'" \i In! Ii Pnid^nliril h;»s earned by sea etly investing the 
pledged funds. If the legislature had wanted the statute to deal with "profits," it could 
easily have done so. 
L). Deposited, into "non interest bearing accoui it" 
A- n-ted iri si lbsectioi i C, a be s, 1 :illi i identia 1 sc i it tl ne follow ingform letter to all of 
its mortgage customers: 
You may continue your monthly payment as is now provided for in your 
loan document to be deposited in a non interest bearing . . . account, 
(Emphasis added ) (R 3007 ) 
Huwcu i Midst in li.is Mijuinl ih.il IVinlnin.il did not dcposi! tIn ptcxlpt: payments 
into a "non interest bearing" account as promised by Prudential's letter. Madsen 
supported this argument with the Affidavit of Andrew Can* Conway.5 
Prudential did not deposit the funds designated for taxes and 
insurance within Madsen'^ monthly payments into a "non-ink recf 
bearing reserve'!'• "0' ,MI " Briel of Appellam ,*1 i~ ^ 
Prudential gives two pages of accounting conclusions why the Conway affidavit 
should be disregarded. However,, Pruderitiars attorneys are not accountants (nor are the 
5
 IV,!. v wiiv.ay is a Certified Fraud Ex an n - a , J t. .rtified Financial Investigator, 
and a Certified Public Accountant, with thirty years of experience with the Securities and 
Exchange Commission and the Internal Revenue Service. (R. 11883-4.) 
I Il 
judges of this court accountants). The only expert testimony on this issue is from Mr. 
Conway. This court should ignore the attempts of Prudential's attorneys to give 
accounting testimony and accounting conclusions. See e.g., Phillips Oil Co. v. OKC 
Corp., 812 F.2d 265, 280-281 (5th Cir. 1987). 
Words of art and technical terms must be given their technical 
meaning when the contract involves a technical matter. 
. . . [I]n this case, the admission of the expert testimony of 
individuals experienced in the oil and gas accounting field for the 
purpose of obtaining explanation of the technical meanings of terms 
used in the net profits accounting provisions of the Farmout seems 
prudent. 
See also Coastal Georgia Regional Development Center v. Higdon, 263 Ga. 927, 439 
S.E.2d 902 (1994). 
E. Form letter sent "pursuant to this Chapter" [§ 7-17-4(2) U.C.A.] 
Subsections C and D above discuss a form letter which Prudential sent out to 
customers in June of 1979. Prudential claims that the form letter cut-off6 all damage 
claims after June 30, 1979. Madsen's opening Brief argued that the letter could not cut 
off damages because the letter did not state that it was sent out "pursuant to this chapter" 
[of the new statute] as required by § 7-17-4(2) U.C.A.7 (Compare Brief of Appellant at p. 
18.) However, Prudential argues that it has satisfied the statutory requirement (to advise 
6
 That entire form letter is reprinted at p. 14 of Madsen's opening Brief (R. 3007.) 
7
 § 7-17-4(2) U.C.A. states: "the notice required by this Subsection 2 shall . . . 
clearly . . . state that . . . the notice is being given pursuant to this chapter." (Emphasis 
added.) 
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customers that the letter was sent "pursuant to this Act") by including the following 
language at the bottom of the letter: 
While Prudential is governed by Federal and not State Law in matters 
dealing with the terms of a loan contract, the options as set forth 
herein are consistent with the provisions of Utah Law . (R. 3007.) 
(Emphasis added.) 
Prudential's argument is so frivolous that no detailed response is necessary. It was 
the obvious intent of the legislature that customers who received the form letter could read 
the actual statute if they wanted more information on the fonn letter which they had just 
received. But, the Prudential fonn letter simply stated that the letter was "consistent with 
the provisions of Utah law." Thus, customers receiving the Prudential letter would have 
had to read all the "provisions of Utah law" if they wanted more infonnation. Of course 
that is absurd.8 
The case of Longley v. Leucadia Financial Corp., 2000 UT 69, 9 P.3d 762, is on 
point. The issue in Longley was whether the state had given proper statutory notice in a 
water rights case. Our Supreme Court ruled: 
8
 Prudential argued that the statute was not yet codified. But even if the statute 
was not codified, the Prudential form letter could have referred to Senate Bill 85 as was 
the case in Nixon v. American Savings & Loan Assn., 635 P.2d 24 (Utah 1981). It would 
have been fairly easy for Prudential customers to get copies of Senate Bill 85 if they 
wanted more background information. But it would have been virtually impossible for 
customers of Prudential to read all of "Utah law" if they wanted more information. 
Further, Prudential never presented any evidence that Senate Bill 85 had not been 
codified when the Prudential form letter was sent out in June of 1979. Prudential 
cites R. 11105-07 as proof that Senate Bill 85 had not been codified. However, 
Prudential's cite to the record (R. 11105-07) merely refers to Prudential's own argument, 
not to evidence. 
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This conclusion [of the Court of Appeals] fails to take account of the 
consequences of inadequate notice. We hold that the deficiencies in 
the public notice rendered the notice invalid . . . (9 P.3d at 766, %18) 
F. Mitigation of Damages 
Next, Prudential argues that damages were ended in 1979 even without reference 
to the new statute § 7-17-1 et. seq. Specifically, Prudential relies upon the following 
comments made by Judge Rigtrup from the bench at the close of trial: 
THE COURT: You may make an offer of proof. My ruling is 
still the same. My ruling is predicated upon the fact that Prudential 
sent notices to all account holders saying, "We are not going to keep 
your money unless you can consent to us not paying interest, and we 
are not going to charge you. Or in the alternative you can take your 
money." 
They had an opportunity, whether by statute or by an act of 
God or whatever, they got a specific notice saying that they could 
take their money. And they all had an opportunity to mitigate 
damages. R. 3717 at 292-93. (Ex. A hereto.) 
Based on the Court's verbal comments, above, Prudential submitted a proposed 
written Conclusion of Law on the mitigation. (R. 3799.) However, Madsen filed the 
following objection to the proposed Conclusion of Law on mitigation: 
Prudential raises the issue of mitigation for the first time.9 
Mitigation is an affirmative defense which must be pleaded. Utah 
Rule of Civil Procedure, 8(a). The failure to plead mitigation results 
in a waiver of the defense. Pratt v. Bd ofEduc, 564 P.2d 294 (Utah 
1977). Moreover, no testimony or arguments were offered on the 
issue of mitigation. Finally, the issue of mitigation was not framed 
in the Court's bifurcation order of September 3, 1985. . . . 
9
 [footnote from original] Prudential relies on some early remarks by the Court. 
(Tr. 290-308.) [See Ex. A.] However, those remarks were gratuitous since there was no 
issue pending and no evidence had been received on that issue. 
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Mitigation is a matter on which Prudential had the burden of proof. 
Having chosen not to present evidence on the issue, or argue the 
point, Prudential is now foreclosed from raising the issue by way of 
"findings" by the Court. Pratt v. Bd. ofEduc, supra. (R. 2665.) 
Prudential opposed Madsen's objection (above) at R. 2781-2782. 
Based on the foregoing arguments, the trial court refused to include anything about 
mitigation in the final signed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. See R. 2994 -
3004. 
POINT VIT 
PREJUDGMENT INTEREST 
A. Ascertainable 
Madsen's opening Brief argued (at p. 19-21) that the Supreme Court opinion in 
Madsen I was binding on the issue of prejudgment interest. Specifically, Madsen relied 
on the following language from Madsen I: 
[I]t (is) of no consequence that the amount of the funds subjected to 
the lien, and thus, the amount of the lien, may vary during the 
existence of the pledge. The amount is ascertainable10 at any given 
time, and thus the lien is perfected as to amount. (Emphasis added.) 
The language from Madsen I above, ("ascertainable") follows the Utah Supreme 
Court's classic test for prejudgment interest set forth in Fell v. Union Pacific Ry. Co., 32 
Utah 101, 88 P.1003, 1007 (1907): 
The true test to be applied as to whether interest should be allowed 
before judgment. . . is . . . whether the injury and consequent 
damages are complete and must be ascertained as of a particular 
10Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (Fifth Ed. 2002) ("ascertain: find out or 
learn for a certainty"). 
18 
time and in accordance with fixed rules of evidence and known 
standards of value . . . (Emphasis added.) 
See also: Crowley v. Black, 2007 UT App 245, f7, 582 Utah Adv. Rep. 6: "A party is 
entitled to interest on past due money when both the amount due and the due date may be 
ascertained." And, indeed. Judge Rigtrup has ascertained the damages in this case. 
See Findings of Fact 9, 12, and 13 at R. 2999 and R. 3000. (Also Exhibit D of Madsen's 
opening Brief) Thus, prejudgment interest should be awarded. 
B. Prejudgment Interest on Equitable Claims 
Prudential also claims that Madsen (and other class members) are not entitled to 
prejudgment interest on equitable claims. (Brief of Appellee and Cross-Appellant at p. 
39.) However, this is not a case where the trial court applied equity in determining the 
award to Madsen. Rather, in the case at bar the amount of the award was 
"ascertainable." (See subsection A above) 
In the case of Bennett v. Huish, 2007 UT App 19, ftf, 155 P.3d 917, describes the 
type of case where prejudgment interest is not allowed. 
The nature of losses that cannot be calculated with mathematical 
accuracy are those in which damage amounts are to be determined by 
the broad discretion of the trier of fact, such as cases of personal 
injury, wrongful death, defamation of character, and false 
imprisonment. 
Of course, the instant case does not fall within the above categories. 
See also Simper v. Scorup, 78 Utah 71,1 P.2d 941 (1931). (Prejudgment interest 
awarded in suit for an accounting in equity.) 
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C. Marshaling 
Prudential claims that Madsen has not marshaled the evidence to support 
prejudgment interest. However, Madsen's argument on prejudgment interest is based on 
the mandate in Madsen I that Madsen's damages are "ascertainable at any given time." 
POINT VIII 
COMPOUND INTEREST 
Prudential cites several cases which have rejected compound interest. But see 
Wilcox v. Anchor Wate Co., 2007 UT 39,1J47, 577 Utah Adv. Rep. 19: 
Consistent with federal law, the determination of whether the 
prejudgment interest should be compounded annually lies within the 
sound discretion of the trial court. 
Again, the mandate of the Utah Supreme Court is Madsen I is controlling on the 
issue of compounding. In Madsen /, the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
The pledgee has the duty to account to the pledgor for the increase or 
profits accruing to the pledgee as a result of the possession of the 
pledged chattel. (Emphasis added.) Madsen I at 1340. 
In this case, the trial court entered Finding of Fact Tf 14 that: 
The court finds it appropriate under the facts of this case to 
compound on an annual basis. The court finds that Prudential must 
disgorge these compounded profits to make Madsen whole.11 
(Emphasis added.) R. 3000. (See Brief of Appellants at Ex. D, p. 7.) 
1
' Thus, the award of compound interest was based upon a factual finding (Finding 
of Fact \ 14) by the Court that Prudential must pay compound interest "in order to make 
Madsen whole." However, Prudential has attempted to challenge this factual finding 
without marshaling the evidence. See Guinasso v. Pacific First Federal Sav. and Loan 
Assn., 89 Or. App. 270, 749 P.2d 577 (1988) for an identical case in which compound 
interest was awarded. 
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In summary, the trial court reached a factual conclusion that Prudential had earned 
and pocketed compounded interest on the funds. Therefore, pursuant to the mandate in 
Madsen /, the award of compound interest was necessary so that Madsen would receive 
the "increase or profits accruing to the pledgee." (See quote from Madsen I above.) 
Finally, Madsen's opening Brief cited Comment 207(2) of the Restatement of 
Trusts (1959): 
If the trustee uses trust funds in his own business and it does not 
appear how much he has eamed thereon, he is ordinarily chargeable 
with compound interest on the ground that he probably received a 
return from the trust fund so used at least equal to compound interest. 
Prudential's response is that the "present situation is not a trust." But, see Western 
Securities Co. v. Silver King Consol Mining Co., 57 Utah 88, 192 P. 664, 674 (1920): 
Under the law, therefore, appellant was entitled to dividends that 
were declared on the stock during the time it remained in pledge, and 
it necessarily follows that it received such dividends as a trustee for 
the benefit of the pledgor of the stock, and was bound to account for 
them . . . (Emphasis added.) 
POINT IX 
SINGLE FAMILY PRIMARY RESIDENCE LOANS 
A. Excluding Class Members based on "Guesswork." 
In 1977, Judge Croft certified the class in this case to include: 
[A] 11 persons who are presently parties to trust deed contracts, with 
defendant wherein the contract provides that: [Prudential is holding 
pledged funds.] (R. 640.) (Emphasis added.) 
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Nearly twenty years later, in 1996, Judge Rigtrup narrowed the class by excluding 
duplexes, triplexes, second homes (or cabins) and corporate owned homes. (R. 5522.) 
The basis for Judge Rigtrup's ruling was guesswork. Judge Rigtrup guessed that: 
[W]here they are either holding rental property or apartments or 
commercial kinds of loans, they may have an interest to go back and 
borrow more money. And so they'd be concerned with the 
relationship with Prudential in terms of being able to go back to the 
well. (R. 5523.) 
On appeal, Madsen's core argument was that: 
Neither Judge Rigtrup nor Prudential have ever cited a single case 
which holds that a court can exclude some parties from a class on the 
guess that they might not want to be part of the class. Brief of 
Appellants at p. 25-26. 
Prudential has now filed its Brief of Appellee and Cross-Appellant but Prudential 
has still failed to cite a single case where a court excluded potential class members on the 
guess that they may not want to be part of the class. See Lanner v. Wimmer, 662 F.2d 
1349, 1357 (10th Cir. 1981) ("It is not 'fatal if some members of the class might prefer 
not to have violation of their rights remedied.'"); Elliott v. ITT Corp., 150 F.R.D. 569, 
575 (N.D. 111. 1992) ("A class may be certified even though the initial definition includes 
members who have not been injured or do not wish to pursue their claims against the 
defendant.'5); Harrington v. City of Albuquerque, 222 F.R.D. 505, 513 (D.N.M. 2004) 
("Moreover, even if some class members do not share the named Plaintiffs'... 
motivation for the present litigation, that is insufficient alone to defeat class 
certification.") 
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B. Notice to Classmembers who are dropped from the Class 
Madsen's opening Brief argues that Judge Rigtrup should have given notice to 
those class members (duplex owners, triplex owners, etc.) who were dropped in 1996. 
Madsen relied upon Rule 23(e) U.R.C.P.: 
A class action shall not be dismissed . . . without approval of the 
court and notice of the proposed dismissal. . . shall be given to all 
members of the class in such manner as the court directs. (Emphasis 
added.) 
Prudential's response is that Rule 23(e) does not apply when the court drops some 
classmembers.12 However, notice must be given if members are excluded because of an 
amendment to the complaint or a problem with the class representative.13 
But suppose Prudential's argument is correct. Suppose that the Court had no 
obligation in 1996 to advise duplex and triplex owners that they were dropped from the 
class. That simply means that the problem is delayed until today. See American Tierra 
Corp. v. City of West Jordan, 840 P.2d 757, 762 (Utah 1981) 
We agree with the federal interpretations and conclude as a matter of 
Utah law that when a proper appeal of a class certification decision is 
taken, the tolling benefit continues on behalf of all members of the 
class until the class issue is finally determined by the decision on 
appeal. 
12
 Prudential relied upon Davoll v. Webb, 194 F.3d 1116 (10th Cir. 1999); and In 
re Integra Realty Resources, Inc., 262 F.3d 1089 (10th Cir. 2001). However, the facts 
and issues in Davoll and Integra Realty are totally different from the case at bar. 
"Yqffe v.Detroit Steel Corp., 50RR.D.481 (N.D. 111. 1970) and Alexander v. 
Avco Corp., 380 F. Supp. 1282 (M.D. Tenn. 1974), respectively. 
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In summary, if this court concludes that Judge Rigtrup properly dropped duplexes, 
triplexes, second homes, and commercial properties in his 1996 Ruling, the statute of 
limitations would have been tolled for duplexes, triplexes, etc. until the decision of this 
court on appeal. That simply opens the floodgates for thousands of those duplexes and 
triplex owners to file individual lawsuits after this decision is published. And, of course, 
they will all win because they signed identical contracts. Thus, the courts of this state 
would be backlogged and overcrowded for no good reason. 
C. Amended Complaint 
Prudential claims that Madsen's Substitute Third Amended Complaint (R. 975) 
had the effect of excluding duplexes, triplexes, second homes and commercial properties. 
First of all, it is important to note that the class description included at paragraph 5 of the 
Substitute Third Amended Complaint is identical to the class originally certified by Judge 
Croft in 1977. (R. 640-41.) Importantly, duplexes, triplexes, etc. were included in Judge 
Croft's original class certification and duplexes, triplexes, etc. were also included in the 
Sustitute Third Amended Complaint. Compare R. 976 and R. 640-41. 
Second, the question of whether or how a certified class can be enlarged by an 
amended pleading has been definitely resolved in Madsen III which states: 
Prudential asserts that amended complaints filed by the Madsens 
have added new legal theories to the case and have sought 
enlargement of the plaintiff class. The result, Prudential claims, is a 
plaintiff class whose boundaries are imprecise. 
Notwithstanding Prudential's assertions, this case has a 
precisely defined plaintiff class, consisting of Prudential borrowers 
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whose trust deeds contain language identical to the Madsen's trust 
deed. The class was certified by Judge Croft in 1977. . . . 
While it is true that the Madsens did seek to enlarge the class, 
a new plaintiff class has never been certified. Allegations 
alone do not act to enlarge an existing class. (Emphasis 
added.)14 Madsen III, 161 P.2d at 547. 
However, if the Substitute Third Amended Complaint (R. 974) had the effect of 
dropping duplexes, triplexes, etc. from the class, Culver City of Milwaukee, 277 F.3d 908, 
915 (7th Cir. 2002) is on point: 
Part of any order "altering" the certification in this way should be a 
provision for notice to the class members. 
Of course, no notice was ever sent to duplex owners, triplex owners, and owners of 
commercial properties that they had been excluded from the class. 
POINT X 
PRUDENTIAL HAS ATTEMPTED TO HIDE GRAVE DEFECTS 
IN THE MASTER'S WORK PRODUCT 
Madsen's opening Brief pointed out several problems in the Master's work 
product. Those defects are summarized below. 
14
 Madsens' Substitute Third Amended Complaint did include an allegation 
defining "real estate loan" as a "single-family" residence. (See R. 975, f4a). However, as 
stated above: "Allegations alone do not act to enlarge an existing class." (Madsen III at 
547.) Furthermore, the allegations relating to "single-family residence" relate to 
Plaintiffs' Claim for Statutory Damages (R. 984-86) and that Plainitiffs' Claim for 
Statutory Damages is not part of this appeal. On the other hand, Plaintiffs' Claim for 
Accounting and Unjust Enrichment (R. 980) includes duplexes, triplexes, commercial 
properties, etc. (Compare R. 976 f5 and R. 981 1f2l(b).) Finally, plaintiffs' claims to 
certify a defendant class (R. 978 [^13) were dismissed by the trial court (R. 1950-51) and 
claims for a defendant class are not part of this appeal. Thus the only defendant 
remaining in the Substitute Third Amended Complaint is Prudential. 
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A. Master Secretly Offered to Show Draft of Final Report to Prudential 
(See Brief of Appellant at pp. 29-30) 
James Loebbecke was an expert witness for Prudential. (R. 8533, 8635, 8687.) He 
made the following hand written notes after an ex parte meeting with the Master: 
Ed [Erickson - the Master] will draft his findings for a meeting with 
attorneys. Will share with me first. (Emphasis added.) (R. 9672.) 
Importantly, the Master has admitted that he presented his preliminary report to 
Prudential and not to Madsen. R. 9700 -01. 
The above conduct squarely violated Rule 53(e)(5) U.R.C.P. which states: 
Before filing his report a Master may submit a draft thereof to 
counsel for all parties for the purpose of receiving their suggestions. 
(Emphasis added.) 
Prudential's response to the argument about ex parte meetings was that: 
The trial court correctly rejected Madsens' argument that the 
Special Master engaged in inappropriate ex parte meetings with 
Prudential personnel, finding that the communications were fully 
within the Special Master's scope of authority, were known to 
Madsen and to the Court, and were required to fulfill the tasks given 
by the Court to the Special Master. . . . The Special Master's 
communication with Prudential personnel... was authorized by the 
Court. . . (Emphasis added.) Brief of Appellee and Cross-Appellant 
at p. 46-47. 
The above comments are an absolute misrepresentation of the Record. The trial 
court has made absolutely no "finding" that the special master was "authorized" to 
participate in ex parte meetings with Prudential's expert witness. 
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Madsen is willing to concede arguendo that there might have been circumstances 
when it may have been appropriate for the Special Master to meet with bank "personnel" 
to review records. But it was a huge step for the master to go beyond bank "personnel" 
and meet with the "expert witness" for Prudential. It is respectfully submitted that there 
was no reason and no approval for the Master to hold ex parte meetings with Prudential's 
expert witness. Further, it is respectfully submitted that there was never any court 
approval for the Master to meet ex parte with Prudential's expert witness. 
All of the various citations to the Record (Brief of Appellee and Cross-Appellant at 
p. 46) were justifications or excuses given by the Master not the Judge. 
B. Sorting 70.000 Loan Original Cards 
(See Brief of Appellant at p. 30-31.) 
The Final Judgment was based upon data from 70,000 "loan origination cards." 
But the Master has never seen the 70,000 loan origination cards. (R. 10370, 10485.) 
Furthermore, the Master has: " . . . not yet performed testing to determine if all [70,000] 
loan cards have been properly segregated . . . " (R. 10370.) 
Prudential's Memorandum makes no defense to the grave defect discussed above. 
C. Master's Claim that he had done a "Limited Amount of Testing." 
(See Brief of Appellant at p. 32-33) 
The original universe of 70,000 loan cards fl| B above) was narrowed down (by 
Prudential - not the Master) to a "data base" of 14,482 loan cards.15 (R. 10485-6.) 
15
 The "data base" of 14,482 loan cards would include 14,482 persons who were 
possible or probable class members because they had signed contracts similar or identical 
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With respect to this "data base" of 14,482 loan cards, the Master stated: 
I have only performed a limited amount of testing of this data base, 
primarily in obtaining a sample of 50 loan cards to respond to 
plaintiff counsel's request.. . (R. 10370.) (Emphasis added.) 
In response to the Master's claim that he had done a "limited amount of testing" 
(above), plaintiffs expert (Certified Public Accountant, Certified Fraud Examiner, and 
Certified Financial Investigator) stated: 
That process of picking up and delivering cards is best described as 
an "errand boy." There is absolutely no basis in the accounting 
profession to label that process as "testing". . . First of all, a sample 
of 50 cards from a universe of 70,000 cards is much to small a 
sample to do any legitimate testing. . . . Indeed, there is no 
evidence, based on the Report, that the Master even read the cards. 
In summary, it was deceitful for the Master to pretend that he 
had done a "limited amount of testing" when there was in reality no 
statistical "testing" of any kind, based on his Report dated March 1, 
2002 and the related historical record in the case. (Emphasis from 
original.) (R. 12610.) 
Prudential's Memorandum has not offered any evidence or argument that testing a 
total of 50 loan cards from a universe of 70,000 loan cards can be statistically significant. 
D. Filing 70.000 Loan Cards with the Court 
(See Brief of Appellant at p. 34-36.) 
Rule 53(e)(1) U.R.C.P. states in part: 
The Master shall prepare a report on the matters submitted to him . . . 
and . . . shall file with it a transcript of the proceedings and of the 
evidence and of the original exhibits. (Emphasis added.) 
to the Madsen contract within the relevant time frame. 
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Of course everything in the Master's Report was based upon the 70,000 loan cards, 
but these 70,000 loan cards were not filed with the court. Prudential's only justification 
for not filing the 70,000 loan cards was to cite the court's Order that: 
The Rule does not require the Master to file with the Court each and 
every document used in the statistical plan submitted to the Court. 
(R. 12766.) 
However, Prudential's Brief cites no rule and no case law to support the trial 
court's comments above. Furthermore, Prudential's argument above (based upon the 
Court's comments above) lead to an absurdity. Suppose it us true (as stated by the trial 
court) that: 
The Rule does not require the Master to file with the Court each and 
every document used in the statistical plan submitted to the court. 
(Emphasis added.) 
Why and how can the above language be stretched to mean: 
The Rule does not require the Master to file with the Court any 
documents used in the statistical plan submitted to the Court. 
(Emphasis added.) 
E. Was the Master Finished? 
(See Brief of Appellant at pp. 33-34.) 
Madsen's opening Brief argued that it was error to enter a Final Judgment based 
upon a Master's Report because the Master had admitted that "more testing would be 
required." (R. 12762.) Prudential's response to the argument, above, was that: 
The Special Master's reference to further testing relates to the 
anticipated time when class damages will be distributed to individual 
class members. Brief of Appellee and Cross-Appellant at p. 48. 
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The problem is the Master never said that he would need to do further testing: 
"when damages will be distributed to individual class members." What the Master really 
said was: 
It seemed the court's interest and intent was to obtain an estimate 
. . . I concluded and still believe that the work performed was 
sufficient to provide the Court with a reasonable estimate upon 
which to make further decisions. (R. 12761-62) (See Ex. H to 
Brief of Appellants.) (Emphasis added.) 
So the questions remain: What does the Master mean by "reasonable estimate"? 
What does the Master mean by "further decisions"? Certainly the Court should not enter 
a Final Judgment until the "further decisions" are made. 
F. Did Madsen Waive their Right to See the 70.000 Loan Cards? 
(See Brief of Appellee and Cross-Appellant at pp. 48-49, fh. 15.) 
Prudential argues (in a lengthy footnote16) that Madsen was given an opportunity to 
inspect the 70,000 loan cards. Specifically, Prudential made the following argument in 
the trial court: 
[Djuring the January 15, 2003 hearing, the Madsens' counsel 
claimed that he had never had an opportunity to review all of 
Prudential's loan cards. . . . Accordingly, Judge Fratto ordered that 
Prudential make all of the relevant loan cards available to the 
Madsens' counsel. 
* * * 
Having been given the opportunity to review the cards, but 
declining to do so, the Madsens have waived any argument as to the 
accuracy of the Special Master's conclusions. (Emphasis added.) 
(R. 12358-9.) 
16Which footnote contains a quote attributed to Madsen, supported by UR. 12359." 
However, that record citation is merely argument, unsupported by any testimony. 
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Madsen responded to the foregoing argument in the trial court as follows: 
Prudential totally overlooks the fact that shortly after the 
hearing of January 15, 2003, Judge Fratto recused himself. . . . And 
no order has been signed related to the January 15 hearing. Thus, 
Madsens have not waived anything. . . . Presumably, Prudential will 
continue to cooperate by making the 70,000 loan cards available for 
review at an appropriate time. (R. 12452-3.) 
Because of Madsen's argument, above, the trial court has never made any finding 
or ruling that Madsens had "waived" their right to inspect the 70,000 loan cards. 
POINT XI 
THERE IS A SHORTCUT 
(Compare Brief of Appellant p. 39-44) 
Madsen's opening Brief pointed out that this case is over thirty years old. 
Madsen further argued that if the case is remanded for further findings, that could add 
another five to ten years to the case. Therefore, Madsen proposed that this court adopt the 
"shortcut" set forth in Derenco, Inc. v. Benjamin Franklin Federal Savings and Loan, 182 
Or. 533, 557 P.2d 477 (1978). Prudential's response was that the appellate court has no 
power to create such a shortcut. 
But see Simper v. Scorup, 78 Utah 71, 1 P.2d 941 (1931). In many ways, Simper 
was identical to the case at bar. In Simper, the defendant had a duty to render an 
accounting. However, the defendant made many excuses and no satisfactory accounting 
was ever presented by the defendant. In the end, our Supreme Court stated. 
We, however, are also of the opinion that this litigation 
ought to end. 
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At that point the Supreme Court took over and made its own computations to end 
the case. It is respectfully submitted that this Court has the same power to end this case 
by adopting the Derenco shortcut. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should remand this case, instructing the trial court as set forth in the 
Conclusion of Madsen's opening Brief. 
NOTE ON PAGINATION 
The "Special Note" appended at the end of Madsen's opening Brief (pp. 44-46) 
was a provisional objection, not part of the actual Brief (no more than this note is part of 
the instant brief). Hence these notes would not be included in the page limits set forth in 
Rule 24(g) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. Thus the combination of the 
opening brief (43 2/3 pages) and this brief (31 1/3 pages) do not exceed 75 pages. In the 
event the Court disagrees with this calculation, Madsen respectfully moves the Court, 
pursuant to Rule 24(h) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, to permit the filing of 
this Reply Brief even though it may exceed the page limitation found in Rule 24. 
DATED this Z0~ day of At^o^jf- 2007. 
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Plaintiff and Appellant 
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-j from 13 and you gen 1.17 hours per person s t a r t i n g wi th 
2 13; right? 
3 A. No, not per person. 1.17 hours per year 
4 per loan. 
5 Q Okay. If m fact it only took one employee j 
to do all this work, then you'd be 13 times in error, 
7 I wouldn't you? 
8 MR. PALMER: I object. 
THE COURT: Sustained. 
MR. DeBRY: Okay. I have no further question's 
MR. PALMER: No further questions. 
THE COURT: You may step down. 
MR. PALMER: Now, your Honor, I don't have 
any further witnesses to call, and subject to an offer 
of proof, and I make the offer of proof because we contend 
that there are a number of additional issues m the case 
17 I beyond the question of profit. 
18 j I'd be glad to detail those issues. There 
are at least 24 of them. But to move those issues, we 
would offer the testimony that is contained in the affidavit 
of Edwin Calvert already in the file, the affidavit of 
Gibbs Marsh, already on file. Also, the evidence that 
is contained m Prudential's answers to interrogatories. 
We would offer Prudential's charter,m effect until 1977, 
called Charter K, which specifically says that Prudential 
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n 
is not required to pay earnings on shon-term deposits. I 
We would offer the deposition of 
Arthur Libold, or the testimony as cor:amed m the 
deposition of Mr. Libold. The deposition of Mr. Madsen, 
the documents filed by Mr. DeBry, DV plaintiff, as producec 
by the Federal Home Loan Bank board, Our annual reports, 
the briefs on appeal, and testimony frcn Mr. Adams, an 
auditor of Prudential Federal Savings. 
THE COURT: I tnmK Libold's deposition 
was puolished. 
MR. PALMER: It was. 
THE COURT: And I'm not sure of Mr. Madsen's 
Was there a motion to publish that and has it been 
published? 
MR. PALMER: It was published before the 
last — on the first motion for summary judgment hearing. 
So it's already been published. 
THE COURT: If it's net, it is published 
now7. 
MR. PALMER: Thank you. And m the interest 
of time I! 11 spare you argument as to v^ hat I contend those 
additional issues are. 
THE COURT: As you know, the Supreme Court 
m tne case of Madsen v. Prudential concluded that the 
underlying loan agreement created a pledge, and if tne 
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are not going to get done tomorrow. 
MR. DeBRY: Well, our witness will take, 
I'm guessing, in the neighborhood of one to two hours. 
I don't know what the cross-examination will be, but we 
can do that quickly. 
But there are some documents I would like 
to get in evidence that will take some foundation. I'm 
only saying that it may not require documents because 
under one theory of the case we are entitled to damage 
for that period of time, and therefore, what they did 
during the 1980fs is relevant. 
Now, at the end of the case — 
THE COURT: I don't know what that theory 
is. 
MR. De3RY: Let me explain it, then, because 
I know the Court's been troubled. You have ruled on the 
constitutional issue and I won't belabor that. But you 
ruled in an earlier time and you again ruled yesterday 
that the statute was constiturional, and because of the 
statute, that cut off the damages after 1979. 
There is a major difference between this 
case and the earlier case you heard, and that specific 
difference is that this case was filed and on file before 
the statute was passed. 
THE COURT: And I understand that. 
290 
MR. DeBRY: And the statute specifically 
exempted cases before the statute. It's not a constitution 
argument. The statute says that this statute does not 
apply to lawsuits filed before July 1 of 1979. 
THE COURT: My rationale is that 
3 V i i U c J - X C O U i. i W L-J- W- C. W J- L J l C i L D L U U C . 
represent him in this case. You appeared before the commit! 
of the legislature, as I understand it, or were deeply 
involved in it, number one. 
Two, he received specific notice, which 
I think you agreed to, from Prudential saying that "We 
are no longer going to maintain escrows, and if you want 
us to do it, we'll do it at no cost to you and no interest 
to you. If you don't like that, take your money." 
And on the basis of mitigation of damages, 
that's sufficient to convince me that the statutory scheme 
applies to him and he had an obligation to mitigate, and 
he didn't do that. 
He didn't take his money. And if he chooses 
to leave it there on the theory that the damages keep 
accruing against the defendant, just on general mitigation 
theories, I don't buy off on it. 
MR. DeBRY: That rationale works with respec 
to everybody that didn't have a lawsuit pending. But 
the statute specifically says that the provisions of 
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1 this acr snail apply 10 all actions filed after February 1 
2 of 1979. So let me follow the way it works, at least 
3 to maKe a record here. Prudential comes m a^d they say, 
4 "We don't owe money after July 1 of 197 9. And the reason 
5 we don't owe money afrer July 1 of 1979 is because of » 
this statute, 7-17-4 , wmch says we can send out a notice.", 
7 | Now, the notice isn't in the courtroom, 
8 I can't be used because this doesn't apply to this lawsuit. J 
Now, the legislature specifically said that mis lawsuit ' 
can keep going witnout regard to the staiuxe. 
Now, maybe you want to rule now, or not, 
but at leasr under mat tneory we are entitled to a proffer 
of proof with respect to trie inclusive period of 19BO. 
THE COURT: Yoa may make an offer of proof. 
My ruling is still tne same. My ruling is predicated 
upon the fact that Prudential sent notices to all account 
17 I holders saying, "We are not going to keep your money unless! 
18 you can consent to us not paying interest, and we are 
19 not going to charge you. Or m the alternative you can 
20 J take your money." 
They had an opportunity, whether by statute 
22 ( or by an act of God or whatever, tney got a specific notice 
23 | saying tnat tney could take tneir money. And they all 
24 I had an opportunity to mitigate damages 
25 And based on that notion, then the Court 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
i 
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is concluding that they 
been given 
the earlier 
They, as a 
i And on that 
the opportuni 
filing of a 
can*t simply sit there, 
ty to mitigate damages, 
lawsuit, and let the car 
having 
notwithst 
-ages run. 
matter of common law, must mitigate damages. 
. notion, and 
MR. DeBRY: 
with the Court, but just 
correct — 
or is this 
to what the 
trial, and 
MR. PALMER 
argument, or 
MR. DeBRY: 
MR. PALMER 
Court has ru 
Counsel keeps 
with the Court and then 
THE COURT: 
constitutionality. The 
notices are 
notice that 
sufficient 
that notion alone, I so rule. 
Okay. I don't want to quibble 
to be sure we have the 
: Is this opening star 
— 
He's making a ruling. 
: It sounds very repet 
led on 14 times, or Ion 
saying he doesn't want 
proceeds to do that. 
I have ruled on the 
statute is constitution 
sufficient to place all account hoi 
they can take their money and go, a 
that they mus 
Now, let's 
on the front end, and le 
decide the 
record, I 
scope of the 
MR. DeBRY: 
think the Cou 
record 
ement, 
itious 
g before 
to argue 
al. The 
ders on 
nc that's 
t mitigate their damages. 
talk about the limitat 
t me rule on that. And 
rest of the trial. 
I need 30 seconds to 
ions prob. 
we'll 
make a 
rt is very firm. Our position i 
2S 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
21 
22 
23 
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1 that the reason the notice was not sufficient or adequate 
2 is because they didn't tell the whole story. Part of 
3 what they didn't tell is they were earning a profit. Had 
4 they revealed that, Mr. Macsen and other people might 
5 have made a different choice. 
5 j I would like to call Mr. Adams to the stand, 
7 please. 
THE COURT: The Supreme Court case talks 
about prejudice. It doesn't talk about contract. And 
you take the approach that they had a contract that was 
struck before the statute was enacted and constitutional. 
The legislature can Tt impair contracts, but the Supreme 
Court simply said by contractual definition it created 
a pledge.. There's no language in there about paying or 
not paying, because the contract created a common law 
1B I pledge. 
17 Then it says that if the pledgee earns a 
T8 profit, then the pledgor is entitled to an accounting 
19 and a disgorgement of the profits, 
20 I And along those lines of a pledge obligation j 
not contract — there was a reasonable notice given 
sufficient to place them on notice that he didn't have 
to leave his pledge property with them, and he could take 
it. And I think that's sufficient in all cases to terminate 
25 the running of the additional profits or interest. 
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hear the 
argument 
The contr 
notice th 
1 4- r\ j v~-w 
Mr. 
the 
it i 
of t 
to c 
yet. 
when 
let' 
the 
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jury 
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n the 
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ther 
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he!s 
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argument 
is a lit 
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I am 
tie diff 
act itself, but 
ey sent, 
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lature. 
media, 
Mr. 
nd. He' 
MR. 
if it!s 
COURT: 
case. 
You art 
in artic 
Madsen 
You have been very patient to 
prepared on contract, and this 
erent. It's not impairment. 
due process, whether or not the 
not full disclosure, is enough 
Mr. Madsen was represented by 
It was on file. You were before 
iculated it. You articulated 
les. 
can't claim ignorance or anythin 
s our test case. 
DeBRY: 
class members. 
THE 
you want 
COURT: 
to talk 
entitled to a p 
s dispose of 
MR. 
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Imer fil 
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about the limitations as to 
rofit, on the front end, and 
Maybe we can just move througr 
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1 ruled with respect to the limitation on the tail end, 
2 and there is still the problem of the issue with respect 
3 to when the clock starts running on the front end. 
4 MR. DeBRY; We are ready to argue that then 
5 now, if that would be helpful. 
5 Your Honor, with respect to the statute 
7 of limitations on the front end, I refer the Court to 
8 Section 78-12-34, Utah Code Annotated, which says that 
there is no statute of limitations at all with respect 
to actions brought to recover money or other property 
deposited with any bank, trust association or savings 
and loan. Madsen put money in in ! 6 4 . 
Let's assume our theory of the case. Let's 
assume that they kept the money wrongfully, they earned 
a profit, even if that profit is $1, and they didn !t give 
the money to him. 
17 I Eventually they give the money to the tax 
18 authorities, but what remained left over is 100 per cent 
19 profit. 
20 J Is that a deposit? If it's a deposit, the 
statute applies. We think that it's a deposit is clear 
22 I as a bill because of a number of reasons. We have cited 
23 the dictionary, but most important is that the federal i 
24 | regulation applied to banks says, "Money received or held 
25 i by the depository institution or the equivalent given 
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i ] for money or its equivalent received or held by the 
2 | depository institution in the usual course of business 
3 | for a special or specific purpose, regardless of legal 
4 | relationship established thereby, including escrow funds 
5 | it specifically says escrow funds is a deposit. 
6 j And you save the court time, without going 
7 through the additional definitions, but the dictionary 
8 says that a pledge is a profit. So we think there is 
9 no statute of limitations at all. 
10 If there is a statute, we think there is 
1«I a discovery rule that applies, and we rely on The Commer 
12 Bank v. Spanish Fork South Irrigation Company.. We gave 
13 a copy of that to the Court yesterday. But specifically 
14 in a pledge case the Court said, "Furthermore — " they 
15 said that in a pledge case, "it is our view that the 
16 applicable statute of limitations would not begin to run 
17 on this action until the infirmity in the certificate 
18 was discovered, or by reasonable diligence could have 
19 been discovered." 
20 We also read to the Court the other day 
21 from Corpus Juris Secundum under pledges, and the citati 
22 is in the record. It says exactly that. It says that 
23 you don ft have an action — the statute of limitations 
24 doesn't start to run on a pledge"until you know the plec 
25 has been misused. Now, I think the Court is familiar 
2! 
4 
14 
20 
21 
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25 
1
 with that background, and I think the Court is bothered 
2
 or concerned by the fact that Mr. Madsen may have been 
3
 I unhappy or grumbled about the arrangement 
THE COURT: No. No. 1 grumbled. I was 
5
 I unhappy. I didn't like it either. I'm not singling 
6
 Mr. Madsen out. 
7
 ) MR. DeBRY: Let me simply say that it doesn't 
8 I matter if you're unhappy, if you're grumbling. It doesn't ' 
9
 even matter if you think it's unfair. The statute doesn't 
10 begin to run until you have a knowledge, until you discover 
11 that they are earning a profit on it. When you learn 
12 theyfve earned a profit on it, until then it can't begin 
13 | to run. We filed a supplemental trial brief, your Honor, 
and there's one additional theory the Court ought to be 
15 | aware of. That is the famous antitrust case, Hanover Shoe 
IS I v. United Shoe. It's in our supplemental brief, but we 
17
 | have a copy here for the Court 
18
 1 The idea is that if it's a wrongful business 
19
 I practice and a continuing business practice — here we 
have the same practice year after year -- the statute 
doesn't begin to run on that continuing business practice. 
You go back to the beginning of the business practice. 
It's not told every time you make a check. And that seems 
to be correct law certainly with respect to antitrust, 
because this is the United States Suoreme Court. And 
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it's a little bit like what happens, your Honor, with 
the doctors and malpractice. The statute is really told. 
The statute doesn't start to run. It's not so much when 
you discover a medical malpractice. Well, there's good 
Utah case that escapes me now, but as long as you're going 
to the same doctor it doesn't start to run. 
As long as you're dealing with the same 
underlying business practice, it's just a recurrent' 
..cyclical business practice. It doesn't really start to 
run. 
Mr. Norman testified and he showed us all 
these nice boxes, 20 or 30 boxes. It's a year-round box. 
where in that box do you make the marks and say that it 
starts to run there? It's just a cyclical event that 
keeps going on and going on. Therefore, it doesn't start 
to run at all with respect to a repeated business violatic 
Thank you. 
THE COURT: Mr. Palmer? 
MR. PALMER: Your Honor, first of all, with 
respect to the statute, 78-12-34, it's one that was 
repealed in 1981. Two, it says it applies to actions 
brought to recover money or other property deposited wit!" 
the savings and loan. This isn't an action to recover 
a deposit by any means. 
The purpose of the deposit was to pay taxe; 
29 
ion 
and insurance, and that's what's been done with it. Had 
we not done that, that statute would have been applicable 
But that isn't what this case is about. This is an acti 
4 to recover the profits claimed to have been unjustly received 
on that. So it isn't an action to recover deposits at ; 
s 
all. ; 
Second, this money isn't a deposit. We 
cite Kronish v. Howard Savings Bank, 392At.2d at pace ; 
182, where that exact claim was made. ! 
•On page 182 the court said, "In our view 
the tax payments herein are not deposits at all, either 
general or special." 
According to Webster's Third International 
Dictionary, a deposit may be defined as money that is 
deposited in a bank or with a banker that is subject to 
order. 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 I Here it is manifest that unlike a traditional 
18 deposit, the advance tax payments made by plaintiffs are 
19 not in any degree subject to order. Here it is manifest 
20 that unlike a traditional deposit, the advance tax payments 
21 made by plaintiffs are not in any degree subject to order 
22 And then the court cites other cases holding 
23 that these are not deposits in any respect. So I'll pass 
24 that case up to the bench. 
25 Third, Charter K, under which we operate, 
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and which is now relevant and which is offered in the 
affidavit of Gibb Marsh, said that over the period of 
time up until 1977 that we, Prudential, were not required 
to pay interest on short-term deposits, or "pay earnings 
on short-term deposits," to quote it exactly. 
And these deposits, by federal regulation 
which we've already quoted to you, were defined as short-
term deposits. So even if they were to be called deposits, 
then our regulation says that we don't — or our charter — 
plaintiff is a member of the organization and it's bound 
to know the charter -- says that we can't distribute earnir 
on short-term deposits. So they cannot rely on these 
as being deposits, cr they'll have no cause of action 
at all, let alone a limitations problem. 
Furthermore, Regulation Q now in effect 
and in effect over this since 1977 specifically provides 
no interest can be paid on deposits by federal savings 
and loan associations. 
So if you were going to call them deposits, 
they don't recover. The claim that limitations wouldn't 
run until discovery can be sustained under Utah law only 
in a fraud case. The cases that — the Utah cases that 
have been cited to you are fraud cases. I handed those 
to you yesterday afternoon. There isn't a single case 
on this kind of a cuestion that extends limitations. 
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-j To drag in the Hanover Shoe v. United Shoe case, a federal 
2 case, is ridiculous. In rights created by federal law 
3 there is applied a federal tolling principle. It applies 
4 in security law and antitrust law, that even though the 
5 state statute of limitations apply, under federal law 
5 ] IT: doesn't begin to run until there is discovery, until 
7 I they knew or should have known, to be more accurate. 
But that federal tolling lav; does not apply 
to Utah law. And there isn't a case at all in Utah that 
would so say. 
The Hanover Shoe case recognizes a continuing 
illegal business practice. Their practice here wasn't 
illegal, whatever- We have cited to you in our motion 
to — no, there's one other brief. Where's the brief 
that we just handed to the Court yesterday morning? 
We have cited to you the restatement on — 
I can't find it. It's either the restatement on securities 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
19 
21 
22 
23 
24 
18 or on the restatement — well, here it is, 
The Utah Code indicates that unless otherwise 
2o agreed, fungible collateral may be commingled. Now, that's 
this case. This is codified by statute, so we may commingle 
it. That was authorized. After all, Mr. Madsen commingled 
the money in the first instance when he sent us one check. 
And this is not an illegal business practice. It wasn't 
25 against the law to commingle the money in any respect, 
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So that kind of doctrine doesn't extend the period of 
limitations. Instead, what I think applies is the four-ye^ 
period of limitations. 
This statute was filed in February of 1975. 
You go back four years to measure it. I began to think 
it was the three-year statute of limitations for detaining 
personal property, but I don't think that's really applicab! 
I think that it's — this is not a contract claim at all, 
and it certainly is not a written contract claim. It 
comes under the four-year limitation, paragraph B, the 
four-year factor should be applied by law. And that's 
the applicable period of limitations on the back side. 
I submit it. 
THE COURT: Mr. De3ry? 
MR. PALMER: Oh, that's the application 
in Duranco, too. Even the Duranco case applied their 
six-year limitation rather than open-end it forever, and 
it rejected the deposit claim and the trust claim this 
plaintiff here asserts. 
MR. De3RY: They didn't reject the deposit 
claim, but in The Bank of America case they said -- there 
are also two oiher cases — said there was no statute 
of limitations whatsoever for the very reasons I've talked 
about. 
MR. PALMER: I object to the citation of 
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6 
-j The Bank of America case. That case is appealed and albeit 
2 Counsel says that he read in The Wall Street Journal that 
3 it was settled, that's not a final judgment. It hasn't 
4 been appealed and settled. 
5 MR. DeBRY: He can take a precedent. The 
decision in The Bank of America was that there's no statute 
7 I of limitations because of the continuing wrongful conduct. 
8 And because there was no way he could have known about 
9 'it, there was no way he could know specifically that they 
10 were earning a profit. 
With respect to the six years, whether it 
is two, three, four, five, or six, if we get down to years, 
we don't have to file a counterclaim, we don't have to 
say we are suing for breach of contract, though certainly 
this is in the nature of that. We are suing on a written 
instrument. That's what the six-year statute says, that 
if you're suing on a written instrument. All these payments 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
19 
21 
22 
23 
24 
18 were made, all the obligations were incurred, and everything 
was done based on that written instrument. 
20 Were there no written instrument, none of 
this would have happened. 
Now, there was one thing I neglected to 
state, and that is 54 Corpus Juris Secundum limitations 
of actions says that whether it's a deposit or not a deposit 
25 say the bank has money, the statute of limitations does 
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not begin to run until payment is demanded and refused. 
And we cite in our brief three cases. 
i 
And finally, 1 note to the Court the Utah 
Code 68-3-2 which indicates that Utah statutes are to \ 
be liberally construed with the view to effect the object ; 
I 
of the statute and promote justice. I 
i 
If I could just show the Court this footnote 
in the Hanover case and the tort theory case — 
THE COURT: The motion to strike the jury 
demand is granted. The request for jury trial is denied. 
The Court applies on the front end this section of the 
code found in Section 78-12-25, Subparagraph 2. This 
is an action for relief not otherwise provided by law. 
The four-year limitation is applicable. 
The Court takes judicial notice that the action was filed 
March 3, 1975 and fixes the limitation period from 
March 3, 1971 through June 30, 1979. The case relied 
on by plaintiff in 
MR. PALMER: Excuse me, your Honor. I think 
the Court -- on that end it's either June 3, 1975, which 
is the date of the promulgation of the federal regulations 
or it's July 1, '79. That's the date of the promulgation 
of the state statute. You said June 30, '79. 
THE COURT: June 30. We're quibbling about j 
whether it's July 1 or June 30. 
;05 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
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•j MR. DeBRY: And what's the front end? 
2 THE COURT: March 3, 1971 through June 30, 
3 197 9. The Commercial Bank case that you rely on, the 
4 | Utah case, which is the only Utah case you've given me, 
5 I is specifically a case of concealment. It was a case 
6 | where the guy filed an affidavit with the company that 
7 he lost his certificate, when he had not. He sold the 
8 certificate to a purchaser and then through fraud and 
Q deceit and concealment obtained a new certificate, and 
then utilized the new certificate to obtain loans or whateve 
And that's a case where discovery is important. 
Prudential Federal Savings & Loan Association 
is an association, and I'm not sure exactly what all that 
means, but by depositing funds with it you become an 
association member. I don't know whether the by-laws 
or the articles make him a member by being -a borrower 
or not. 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 I MR- PALMER: They do 
THE COURT: Do you have to be a member of 
the association to borrow? 
MR. PALMER: I'm not sure which comes first, 
but they both —once you do one, you're the other. Once 
you become a member you have the right to borrow. 
THE COURT: And I'm not sure that — I'm 
sure on this, but I'm assuming that as a member, just 
306 
following general corporate principles, you are entitled 
Mr. Madsen, to examine business records and books and 
obtain profit and loss statements and inquire into that. | 
It's clear that when you entered the contract' 
i 
in question you got a copy of the contract, you had an ' 
opportunity to read it before you signed it. The contract 
made no provision about interest specifically. You knew 
or should have known about the interest provisions. 
And with reasonable certainty it appears to the Court 
that you could have as well ascertained the financial 
circumstances if profits or interest was of any concern 
to you. 
Since you entered your trust deed agreement 
on September 24, 1964 and did nothing about it until the 
filing of the complaint in this case on March 3, 1975, 
I don't see any basis for the Court reaching any conclusion 
that discovery has any relevance or application in this 
case at all, thus justifying you to trial by jury. It's 
an equitable case. It's an action in accounting, and 
in such matters trial by jury is not a matter of right. 
There was one additional thought I had. 
With respect to the construction of the statutes in terms 
of liberal interpretation, I think the fact is that the 
rule about statutory interpretation is that courts are 
bound to give statutes their plain, direct meaning. It 
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•j wasn't a deposit in this .case. It was a security pledge 
2 made according to the contract by the mortgagor, and 
3 I guess it was a trust deed in this case, as a condition 
4 j of the contract for a specific purpose, namely to pay 
taxes and insurance. 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
20' 
21 
23 
24 
25 
5 
6 
7 I it, or them unlawfully withholding the property, as 
8 j Mr. Palmer has conceded. At the end of the year, I take 
9 I it the evidence is, that Prudential Federal simply paid 
the taxes, paid the insurance as was contemplated by 
the contract, didn't withhold his monkey, and there wasn't 
any demand element of it. He couldn't get the money back. 
And based thereon, the language contained 
in the language provision, the Court concludes, has no 
application and it is simply an action for profits, if 
any, derived on the pledge. 
And I can find nothing, and I went back 
18 I through all the limitations provisions — other than the 
19 J provision, unless otherwise provided by law or not otherwise 
provided by law, and as to that there is a four-year 
limitation. 
22 MR- DeBRY: We are ready to call our first 
w*itness. 
THE COURT: You may proceed. 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
RICHARD MADSEN and NANCY 
MADSEN, his wifef for them-
selves and all others simi-
larly situated, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
PRUDENTIAL FEDERAL SAVINGS & 
LOAN ASSOCIATION, for itself 
and all others similarly 
situated, 
Defendant. 
UTAH BANKERS ASSOCIATION. 
ORDER 
Civil No. 226073 
(Hon. Kenneth Rigtrup) 
On its own motion, the Court called for a hearing on 
the effect of the Supreme Court's ruling in this case (dated 
January 14, 1977). 
The hearing was held on April 12, 1985, at 2:00 p.m. 
Madsen was represented by Robert J. DeBry. Prudential was 
represented by Joseph J. Palmer. Peter Billings, Sr. 
represented amicus curiae (the Utah Bankers Association). Each 
of the parties submitted a memorandum. 
In addition to the pleadings herein, defendant relied 
upon: 
p r o fv o o 
(a) The briefs of the parties on prior appeal to the 
Utah Supreme Court. 
(b) Affidavit of R. Gibb Marsh. 
(c) Affidavit of Hayden Calvert. 
(d) "Study of the Feasibility of Escrow Accounts on 
Residential Mortgages Becoming Interest Bearing," Comptroller 
General of the United States, 1973 and other documents 
furnished by the Federal Home Loan Bank Board to plaintiffs, 
and filed herein by plaintiffs. 
(e) Deposition of Richard Madsen. 
(f) Deposition of Arthur Liebold, Jr. and four 
Federal Home Loan Bank Board opinion letters attached 
thereto. 
(g) Prudential's Answers to Interrogatories. 
After considering the memoranda and other documents, 
and the arguments of counsel, it is ORDERED that: 
1. The trust deed contract between Madsen and 
Prudential is clear and unambiguous so that parole evidence may 
not be considered in construing the instrument; and this Court 
may therefore construe the instrument as a matter of law. 
2. The "budget payments," paid by Madsen pursuant to 
the trust deed, constitute a common law pledge. Defendant will 
not be permitted to offer evidence on the following issues: 
(a) whether the parties intended profits to be paid 
or whether, considering all circumstances, including their 
conduct, the benefit Madsens received, and the industry 
custom and practice, they intended a special agreement 
that compensation or interest not be paid; 
0 H 0 0 °> ( 
(b) whether the parties intended a true pledge 
relationship or a debtor-creditor relationship; 
(c) whether the reserve funds are pledged property or 
a co-mingled, fungible cash deposit; 
(d) whether Prudential was unjustly enriched by use 
of the reserve funds; 
(e) whether payment of compensation on the Madsensf 
reserve funds has been preempted by federal law and 
regulations of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board as a 
matter of fact and of law, since 1964 and all subsequent 
times; 
(f) whether the Madsens have waived their claim, or 
they are barred by estoppel or laches from asserting it. 
3. This matter shall proceed to a trial for the 
purpose of determining whether Prudential has earned any profit 
from the use of the Madsen's pledged funds, and if so, for an 
accounting of those profits. 
DATED this day of — , 1985. 
-> BY THE COURT: 
V*»f 
.3.V1' 
o / v ^ idl .... 
' Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup 
Approved as to form: 
Robert J. DeBry 
Approved as y£5"yform: 
